The great majority of studies on the e¤ect of school quality on academic outcomes do not take account of changes in student choices concerning time use if school quality, e.g. class size, changes. In particular, students might respond to changes in their school quality by adjusting the time and e¤ort devoted to study (with a consequent change in leisure or market work). In this note we show that such biases could be quite serious and could lead to empirical estimates which either overstate or understate the e¤ects on academic outcomes of changes in school quality. The main parameters governing the sign of the bias are shown to be the extent to which inputs in the education production function are substitutes or complements and how kinked is the bene…t from a higher mark. The absolute value of the bias depends also on student ability, the student's distaste for e¤ort and the curvature of the 'production' of the …nal mark with respect to e¤ort.
Introduction
The majority of studies on the e¤ect of 'school quality'on academic outcomes do not take account of changes in student choices concerning time use when school quality changes. 1 In particular, students might respond to changes in their school quality by adjusting the time and e¤ort devoted to study (with a consequent change in leisure or market work). Thus, the 'pure'e¤ects of school quality corresponding to production function parameters may di¤er from empirical estimates. This is similar to the distinction between production function parameters and average policy e¤ects in Todd and Wolpin (2003) where family inputs are allowed to respond to changes in school quality.
A few papers model and estimate the response of parental inputs to changes in school quality. Houtenville and Conway (2008) consider a theoretical model where student achievement depend on parental e¤ort and school resources, and where parents maximize utility, which is a function of student achievement, leisure and consumption, subject to time and budget constraints. In this model, an increase in school resources may induce parents to increase or reduce their effort depending on the form of utility and production functions. Their empirical analysis indicates that parental e¤ort and per-student spending have positive e¤ects on student achievement, and that some measures of parental e¤ort are a¤ected negatively by per-student spending. However, the estimated e¤ect of per-student spending on achievement is not a¤ected by whether or not parental e¤ort is included in the model. Bonesrønning (2004) …nds zero or positive e¤ects on parental e¤ort of reducing class size. Das et al. (2011) consider a dynamic household optimization model where child test scores depend on school and household inputs. Assuming that households make decisions regarding their own inputs before they know the amount of school inputs, they are only able to respond to anticipated changes in school inputs. Using data from Zambia and India the authors …nd that household school expenditure is reduced when anticipated school grants are increased, and that anticipated grants have no effect on student test scores whereas unanticipated grants have signi…cant positive e¤ects.
To our knowledge, De Fraja et al. (2010) is the only paper which explicitly models and estimates the possible response of student e¤ort to changes in school quality. In their theoretical model student e¤ort, parental e¤ort and school e¤ort are simultaneously determined as a Nash equilibrium. In this very general model, a change in an exogenous variable, e.g. an increase in school resources, may increase or reduce the equilibrium level of e¤ort of students (and parents and schools) depending on the form of the utility and education production functions and the values of exogenous variables. In their empirical analysis, the measure of student e¤ort is based on (a factor analysis of) general attitude variables such as whether students like school, whether they think homework is boring and whether they want to leave school. The authors do not …nd any signi…cant e¤ect of class size on their measure of student e¤ort, but they do …nd that student e¤ort is reduced when 'school e¤ort' is increased, where school e¤ort is based on (a factor analysis of mainly) whether streaming and disciplinary methods are used. They …nd that student and parental e¤ort are positively correlated (where parental e¤ort is based on a factor analysis of mainly the teacher's opinion of parents'interest in their child's education) and that class size has no e¤ect on parental e¤ort.
The attitudinal variables used by De Fraja et al. (2010) may be poor proxies for e¤ort or time spent on homework, and they may not be expected to be much a¤ected by (marginal) changes in school resources. Furthermore, the authors ignore the important issue of the endogeneity of class size and assume observed class size variation to be exogenous. These problems may explain why they do not …nd any e¤ect of class size on their measure of student e¤ort.
Some recent papers estimating e¤ects of course-speci…c (or subject-speci…c) school quality inputs on student academic outcomes provide indirectly an indication that students'change of e¤ort in response to changes in school quality may be important. Aaronson et al. (2007) estimate e¤ects of teacher quality and …nd, e.g., statistically signi…cant e¤ects of mathematics teachers on mathematics test scores, but also signi…cant e¤ects of English teachers on mathematics test scores (and of mathematics teachers on English test scores). Heinesen (2010) estimate signi…cant negative e¤ects of subject-speci…c class size on examination marks in the same subject, but the results also indicate negative e¤ects on marks in other subjects. One interpretation of the e¤ects of subject-speci…c school inputs on student outcomes in other subjects is that they are due to spill-over e¤ects between subjects induced by student reallocation of e¤ort between subjects.
In this note we consider simple parametric models with endogenous student e¤ort and show that biases due to students'responses to changes in their school quality could be quite serious and could lead to empirical estimates which either overstate or understate the e¤ects on academic outcomes of changes in school quality. The main parameters governing the sign of the bias are shown to be the extent of substitution in the education production function and how kinked is the bene…t from a higher mark. The absolute value of the bias also depends on the student's distaste for e¤ort, the curvature of the 'production'of the …nal mark with respect to e¤ort and the student's ability in the course of study.
Our main conclusion is that reliable estimates of the 'pure'e¤ect of school quality on academic outcomes requires information on time use (and/or academic e¤ort). This suggests a new round of data collection.
In section 2 we discuss models with one course of study. In section 3 we discuss models with more than one course of study. Section 4 contains conclusions.
2 One course of study
A parametric model
We begin with the simplest case in which a student takes only one course.
2
The outcome is a mark y. This mark is the result of school quality, s, student ability, , and student e¤ort, h.
3 To make our main points as cleanly as possible we ignore uncertainty and take a simple parameterisation for the production function:
Student e¤ort and school quality are normalized so that 0 < h < 1 and 0 < s 1. The parameters and capture the curvature in the output with respect to student e¤ort and school quality, respectively. To ensure that production is increasing and concave in both we assume that 0 < < 1; 0 < < 1; % 1= ; and % > 1, where is the maximum value of . If % < 0 then s and h are substitutes in production, and if % > 0 they are complements. To motivate this function, note that education production may be considered to consist of two learning processes, learning at school (represented by the term s ) and learning at home doing homework (represented by h ), and an interaction e¤ect between the two processes represented by the last term in (1). The marginal e¤ect of school resources may be smaller for well-prepared/high-ability students (% < 0) if the primary goal of teaching is to ensure that all students obtain a basic level of skills. Also, the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort (and ability) may be smaller when school resources are high: when the learning process at school is more e¤ective there may be smaller returns to e¤ort at home to learn the curriculum. In conventional production functions including the Cobb-Douglas and CES functions, inputs are complements, i.e. the marginal product of one input (e.g. h) increases when the amount of the other input (s) is increased. However, as argued above, h and s may be substitutes in production, so that the marginal product of h is reduced when s increases, and vice versa.
4
In empirical studies a parameter of interest is the elasticity of the outcome with respect to school quality:
Note that in the parameterisation (1) the elasticity of interest is not independent of e¤ort and student ability. The same is true for the corresponding derivative @y=@s, except when % = 0. If e¤ort is …xed then we can recover the parameter of interest from observing variation in y due to experimental variation in s.
Typically neither experimental nor non-experimental studies of e¤ects of school quality have access to data on student e¤ort or time use, and therfore the interpretation of estimated e¤ects as education production function parameters presumes that e¤ort is …xed.
However, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that some students might respond to the change in constraints with adjustment in e¤ort expended. To capture this, let preferences be represented by the utility function:
where the maximum time available for study is normalised to unity (as noted above). 5 The parameter captures the taste for leisure and the parameter (> 0) captures the curvature in the concern about the outcome; higher values of give a more kinked bene…t function. That is, for higher values of the student will have a high return below a threshold value of y ('passing') and a low return above.
The bias in the empirical elasticity
Denoting the optimal choices by ĥ ;ŷ the empirical elasticity is given by:
In general, this will not be equal to the 'true'elasticity . We de…ne the empirical bias as =^
The sign of the bias will depend on the sign of the e¤ ort elasticity, @ lnĥ=@ ln s.
Clearly the bias will be positive (^ > ) if the student responds to the increase in school quality by putting in more e¤ort, and the bias will be negative if the e¤ort elasticity is negative. If s and h are substitutes in production (% 0) the e¤ort elasticity and bias are negative. But if they are complements (% > 0) the marginal product of e¤ort is increased when school quality increases, and therefore it may be optimal for the student to increase e¤ort. Whether it is in fact optimal to increase e¤ort depends on the size of % and the other parameters of the model, especially the curvature of the bene…t function with respect to the outcome ( ). Thus, even if s and h are complements it may still be optimal to reduce e¤ort because of the 'income e¤ect': an increase in s enables students to obtain a larger y with less e¤ort (more leisure). We show in the Appendix that the e¤ort elasticity (and therefore the bias) is negative if > 1 or % 0. We now examine further the determinants of the direction and size of the bias.
Although simple, this parameterisation does not yield closed form expressions for the elasticity of interest. We therefore have to resort to simulations to illustrate how the empirical elasticity varies with the parameters. Without loss of generality we can take = 0:4.
6
We take a grid over the values given in table 1 (and calculate the elasticity at s = 1).
7 These values are, of course, wholly arbitrary and serve only to illustrate the variation in the bias of the empirical elasticity. Since the maximum value of is here equal to 10, concavity is ensured when % 0:1.
Parameter minimum maximum grid step With this range of parameter values the minimum and maximum bias of the empirical elasticity are 0:12 and 0:00, respectively. Thus, even when % attains its maximum value of the grid (0:075) the bias is not positive for any combination of the other parameters within the grid of table 1. Table 2 shows that the parameter values that induce the extreme values of the bias are very di¤erent. The table also shows the true and empirical elasticities. The true elasticity is calculated holding h …xed at the optimal level given the parameters, whereas h is adjusted to its new optimal level when calculating the empirical elasticity. As expected, the largest negative bias is obtained when s and h are strong subsitutes in production (% attains its minimum). Also, the bias is more negative if the bene…t function is more curved (high ), if the student has a higher taste for leisure (high ), if the elasticity of output with respect to e¤ort is high (high ), and/or if student ability ( ) is relatively low (although in this case not at its minimum). When s and h are strong complements in production the bias of the empirical elasticity may be substantially positive. This is illustrated in table 3 where % is …xed at 2. Here the largest negative bias is obtained for about the same values of ( ; ; ; ) as in table 2 (except that is 2 instead of 3), whereas the largest positive bias (of 0:055) is obtained for the same parameter values except 6 Results are qualitatively the same for other values of . 7 Choosing other values of s produces qualitatively similar results.
that (the curvature of the bene…t function) is at its minimum instead of its maximum.
True
Empirical Table 3 : Extreme values of the bias of the empirical elasticity when school quality and e¤ort are strong complements (rho=2)
Within any school, we would expect that the parameters ( ; ; ; ; %) are heterogeneous. For example, how important it is to attain more than a simple 'passing' grade will vary from student to student, implying heterogeneity in the parameter . Moreover, the distributions of these parameters may not be independent. For example, high ability students (high ) who aspire to further education may have a lower concern for simply passing.
Di¤erential e¤ects
The results of Summers and Wolfe (1977) , Krueger (1999) , Angrist and Lavy (1999) , Browning and Heinesen (2007) and Heinesen (2010) indicate that reducing class size has larger positive e¤ects for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, and Heinesen (2010) also …nds that low-ability students bene…t signi…cantly more than high-ability students. Aaronson et al. (2007) …nd that teacher-quality e¤ects are relatively larger for lower-ability students.
The simple model described above is consistent with these …ndings since the empirical elasticity,^ , is decreasing in student ability, . The absolute value of the empirical e¤ect of school resources on marks (@ŷ=@s) is also decreasing in for many combinations of values for the other parameters. When % = 0 (i.e., s and h are neither substitutes nor complements in production), the derivative @y=@s in the production function (1) holding h …xed does not depend on . However, the empirical e¤ect @ŷ=@s depends on because students respond to changes in school quality by changing e¤ort. This is illustrated in …gure 1 which shows how^ and @ŷ=@s vary with in the model consisting of (3) and (1) where ( ; ; ) = (1:0; 1:05; 0:4). In the lower part of the …gure % = 0, and the lower right panel shows that @ŷ=@s is decreasing in . The lower left panel shows that the empirical elasiticity decreases much more in . This is not surprising since y determined by the production function (1) holding h …xed and also the optimal valueŷ are strongly increasing in . In the upper part of the …gure % = 0:05 (i.e., s and h are substitutes in production). Whereas the empirical elasticity varies with in much the same way in the two parts of the …gure, @ŷ=@s decreases much more in the upper part of the …gure, where s and h are substitutes, than in the lower part. 
A pass/fail mark
If in this simple model the curvature parameter in the utility function is above a threshold ( > 1), students respond to an increase in school quality by decreasing their e¤ort. Conversely, if < 1 (and % > 0), students may in some cases respond by increasing their e¤ort. To investigate in more detail the e¤ect of the curvature of the bene…t function we consider an extreme case in which:
where I (y y ) is an indicator function that takes value unity if y y and zero otherwise (with y > s ). This corresponds to a pass/fail mark. In this case students will either set:
where we assume that the passing grade is attainable for some feasible level of e¤ort: y < s + (1 + %s ). The student chooses to exert e¤ort if:
This illustrates that, ceteris paribus, a pass grade is more likely if complementarity in production, student ability or school quality are high or if the student has a low taste for leisure. 8 For a given level of school quality we have three groups of students: bad fails; marginal fails (students who failed but were close to choosing to pass) and passes. If we increase school quality then the bad fails continue to exert no e¤ort and fail, the marginal fails increase their e¤ort (the level given in (7) with the new level of s) and pass students reduce their e¤ort and still pass. Thus we have three di¤erent responses to the policy change: negative, zero and positive.
3 More than one course of study When there are more than one course of study, there may be spill-over e¤ects between courses or subjects in the sense that subject-speci…c school inputs may a¤ect student outcomes in other subjects through student reallocation of e¤ort between subjects. This may be illustrated by an extension of the above model framework to the more general case with more than one course of study. simplicity, consider the case with two courses. We assume that the utility function is additive in the two outcomes (with the same curvature parameter) and leisure:
where y i and h i are the outcome (a mark) and student e¤ort in subject i, respectively. We allow student ability ( i ) to di¤er between subjects, but for simplicity we assume that the other parameters in the two subject-speci…c production functions are identical, and we assume their form to be similar to (1):
Denoting the optimal choices by (ĥ 1 ;ĥ 2 ;ŷ 1 ;ŷ 2 ) we may consider four empirical elasticities, namely elasticities of the two outcomes with respect to each of the two school quality inputs:
The two empirical 'own resource'elasticities in (11) consist of a direct e¤ect of increased school resources in subject i on academic outcome in the same subject and an indirect e¤ect through changed e¤ort in subject i. The two empirical cross-elasticities (12) are di¤erent from zero if an increase in school resources in one subject induces students to change e¤ort in the other subject. The true own-resource elasticities, ii = @ ln y i =@ ln s i , consist of only the direct e¤ect, holding e¤ort …xed. The true cross-elasticities, ij = @ ln y i =@ ln s j ; i 6 = j; are zero. The sign of the bias of each of the four empirical elasticities^ ij (i; j = 1; 2) is equal to the sign of the corresponding e¤ort elasticity @ lnĥ i =@ ln s j . We show in the Appendix that @ĥ i =@s i < 0 and @ĥ i =@s j > 0 (i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j) if > 1 or % 0. If we take a grid over the same values of the parameters as given in table 1, where now both 1 and 2 vary between 1 and 10, we obtain the extreme values of the bias of the elasticity^ 11 and the extreme value of (the bias of) the cross-elasticity^ 12 and the associated parameters shown in table 4.
9 The bias of the empirical 'own resource'elasticity^ 11 has extreme values 0:12 and 0:00, and the same is true for the bias of^ 22 (not shown in the table since the model is symmetric in the two subjects). The bias of^ 11 (and^ 22 ) vary with the parameters in basically the same way as the bias of^ in the one-course case (except for the dependence on ability in the other subject): The extreme negative bias is obtained when , and are at their maximum, when % is at its minimum, and when ability in the two subjects is low (although not at the minimum). The maximum bias (zero) is obtained when when , and are at their minimum, when % is at its maximum, and when ability is at its maximum in the same subject and at its minimum in the other subject. The two cross elasticities^ 12 and^ 21 have extreme values 0:00 and 0:05. The extreme positive value of^ 12 is obtained when , and 1 are at their maximum values, and when %, and 2 are at their minimum values. Thus, the elasticity of outcome in one subject with respect to school resources in the other subject is high when % is negative and numerically large, is high, ability in the …rst subject is high and ability in the other subject is low. The minimum of^ 12 is obtained when % = 0 and when , , 1 and 2 are high, and is low.
True
Empirical Bias Parameters elasticity elasticity Table 5 illustrates that when school quality and student e¤ort are strong complements in production (% = 2 in the table) then the bias of^ 11 may be substantially positive (as for^ in the model with a single subject) and^ 12 may be substantially negative. The maximum bias of^ 11 is obtained when and are small and and 1 and 2 are high. The minimum of^ 12 is obtained for the same parameter values, except that 1 is small. However, table 5 also shows that when is large, the bias of^ 11 may be substantially negative and 12 may be substantially positive even when s and h are strong complements in production.
Empirical Bias Parameters elasticity elasticity Figure 2 shows how the empirical elasticities^ ij and the absolute change in the outcomes Dŷ ij , which is the increase inŷ i when s j is increased by 10%, vary with ability in subject 1 when ( 2 ; ; ; ; %) = (5; 0:5; 1:95; 0:6; 0:05). Thus, the values of , and are chosen so that the cross elasticities are relatively large. The own-subject elasticity^ 11 and the absolute change Dŷ 11 are decreasing in 1 corresponding to the results in the one-subject case. The other own-subject elasticity^ 22 (and Dŷ 22 ) do not depend much on 1 , while the cross elasticity^ 21 (and Dŷ 21 ) are decreasing in 1 , and^ 12 (and Dŷ 12 ) are increasing in 1 : The …gure illustrates that the cross elasticities may be rather large compared to the own-subject elasticities. For instance, when 1 = 5 the cross elasticities are about one third of the own-subject elasticities. Thus, when school resources in one course is changed, this may have substantial e¤ects on outcomes also in other courses, and the mechanism behind these cross e¤ects in this simple model is students'reallocation of e¤ort between subjects: When school resources in one course increase it may be optimal for students to reduce e¤ort in this course and increase leisure and e¤ort in the other course. In …gure 2 % = 0:05 so that s i and h i are assumed to be substitutes in production. Setting % equal to zero produces a rather similar …gure although the cross elasticities are a little smaller compared to the own-course elasticities (for 1 = 5 the ratio is 0:27). Assuming inputs to be strong complements in production implies that the ratios of cross elasticities to own-course elasticities are smaller.
Conclusion
Typically, studies on the e¤ect of school quality on academic outcomes do not take account of students'responses regarding academic e¤ort or time use. Applying simple parametric models we have shown that students'e¤ort or time-use responses to changes in school quality may cause large di¤erences between the empirical elasticity of changes in school quality and the education production function elasticity (holding student e¤ort constant). The main parameters determining the sign of the bias are the extent of substitution between e¤ort and school quality in the production function and how kinked is the bene…t from a higher mark in the student utility function. If e¤ort and school quality are substitutes in production and/or if there is a marked kink in the bene…t function, students will tend to reduce e¤ort when school quality is increased implying a negative bias in the empirical elasticity. The value of the bias also depends on the student's distaste for e¤ort, the curvature of the production function with respect to e¤ort and the student's ability in the course of study. In models with two courses of study we show that an increase in school resources in one course may reduce e¤ort in that course, implying a negative bias of the empirical 'ownresource elasticity', but increase e¤ort in the other course implying a positive bias in the empirical 'cross elasticity'. Our main conclusion is that reliable estimates of the 'pure'e¤ect of school quality on academic outcomes require -in addition to exogenous variation in school quality -information on time use and/or academic e¤ort. This suggests a new round of data collection.
Appendix
5.1 E¤ect of school quality on e¤ort in the model with one course of study
We show that @ĥ=@s < 0 if > 1 or % 0: The marginal e¤ect of school quality on e¤ort is found by inserting the production function (1) into the utility function (3) and di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition: 
Thus, the sign of @ĥ=@s is equal to the sign of @ 2 u=@ĥ@s. It is obvious that @ĥ=@s < 0 if (% 0 and < 1) or if (% 0 and > 1). However, @ĥ=@s is also negative when % < 0 and > 1. Thus, when % < 0 and > 1 we have @ 2 u @ĥ@s < 0 , %(1 ) (s + h + %s h ) 1 < 0
, s + h + %s h < 1 1 %
This inequality always holds given the assumed restrictions on the parameters. The RHS of the inequality tends towards its lower limit (10) from above when ! 1 and % = 0:1 (which is the minimum of %). For % = 0:1 the LHS is always below 10 (since the maximum of s and are 1 and 10, respectively, and h < 1). It is easily seen that the inequality also holds when % is increased above 0:1. Thus, we have shown that @ĥ=@s < 0 if % 0 or > 1.
E¤ect of school quality on e¤ort in the model with two courses of study
We show that @ĥ i =@s i < 0 and @ĥ i =@s j > 0 (i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j) if > 1 or % 0: Inserting the production functions (10) into the utility function (9) and di¤erentiating the …rst-order conditions, we have: 
Since A i < 0; we have @ 2 v=@ĥ 2 i < 0: Furthermore, D = A 1 A 2 (A 1 + A 2 ) =(1 h 1 h 2 ) 2 > 0: Thus, @ĥ i =@s i < 0 and @ĥ i =@s j > 0 i¤ %(1 ) y 1 i < 0; and this inequality holds if > 1 or % 0 by arguments similar to the one-course case.
